USA v. Donald Solomon by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-15-2014 
USA v. Donald Solomon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Donald Solomon" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 961. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/961 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3108 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DONALD ABRAHAM SOLOMON, 
                                                  Appellant 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-11-cr-00245-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joy Flowers Conti 
___________ 
 
Argued June 4, 2014 
Before:  HARDIMAN, SCIRICA and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 15, 2014 ) 
 
Robert L. Eberhardt [Argued] 
Rebecca R. Haywood 
Office of United States Attorney 
700 Grant Street 
Suite 4000 
 2 
 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
 Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
 
Elisa A. Long [Argued] 
Office of Federal Public Defender 
1001 Liberty Avenue 
1500 Liberty Center 
Pittsburgh, PA 15222 
 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Donald Solomon, the former police chief of a hamlet 
in Southwestern Pennsylvania, was sentenced to more than 
eleven years in prison after pleading guilty to corruption 
charges. In this appeal, Solomon challenges the District 
Court’s application of two provisions of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines. The first, § 2C1.1(c)(1), is a cross-
reference that directs the sentencing judge to apply the 
Guidelines range for another crime if, for instance, the 
defendant accepted a bribe “for the purpose of facilitating 
[that] criminal offense.” The second, § 3B1.3, is a two-level 
enhancement for abuse of a position of trust. Both challenges 
present questions of first impression.  
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I 
A 
 In 2009, Solomon became the police chief of the 
Borough of East Washington, Pennsylvania, after a decade as 
a part-time officer.  As chief, he was paid $36,100 a year and 
was unable to moonlight because he had to be available 
around the clock.  At about the same time, Solomon and his 
wife divorced after more than fifteen years of marriage.  
Without going into the sordid details of Solomon’s personal 
life, it suffices to note that his behavior after his divorce 
attracted the attention of federal authorities and caused them 
to engage an unidentified confidential informant (CI)—
described by Solomon as “an erstwhile friend”—to probe 
Solomon’s criminal tendencies. Solomon Br. 4. 
 On June 30 and July 1, 2011, the CI met with Solomon 
to discuss providing security services for an unidentified third 
person.  Solomon agreed to run a criminal history check on 
the third person, and also asked the CI if the person wanted to 
Solomon to provide security, as he had “nothing to do on the 
weekends.”  The CI said that Solomon might be able to work 
with him on the job, which required following a vehicle and 
ensuring that nothing happened to it.  The CI told Solomon he 
would be paid at least “a grand,” to which Solomon replied, 
“[t]here has got to be no paper trail . . . under the table.”  
When Solomon called to inquire about the status of the 
criminal history check, he was told the person seeking 
security had a lengthy criminal record; upon reviewing the 
record with the CI at the police station later that day, 
Solomon observed that the security job “could be drug 
related.”  In reference to the third person, Solomon 
responded: “Tell him I’m the best cop money can buy.” 
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 Solomon met with the CI again on July 8, 2011, and 
discussed providing security for a 4-kilogram cocaine deal for 
which they would each be paid $500 per kilogram.  On July 
27, 2011, Solomon and the CI met with the third person, 
“Joseph,” who was really an undercover FBI agent posing as 
a drug trafficker. At the meeting, Solomon agreed to provide 
protection for a multi-kilogram cocaine shipment, and also 
agreed to wear his police uniform and sit in his police car 
while doing so.  Joseph, in turn, agreed to pay Solomon and 
the CI $500 per kilogram for their assistance.  Solomon also 
asked Joseph for advance notice so he could divert other 
officers away from the drug deal.  On August 17, 2011, the CI 
gave Solomon $1,000 cash from Joseph as a “good faith” 
payment in advance of the shipment. 
 On August 23, 2011, the staged drug deal took place in 
a church parking lot in East Washington.  Solomon had a 
shotgun, an AR-15 rifle, and a 9mm handgun with him as he 
sat inside his marked police cruiser with the CI.  When the 
transaction was completed, Joseph paid Solomon $1,500, and 
Solomon then gave the CI $700.  Solomon agreed to provide 
security for future shipments, and exchanged phone numbers 
with Joseph.  He also said he would try to obtain two law 
enforcement-restricted Tasers for Joseph, for $1,000 each; 
Joseph made clear that he planned to use the Tasers to collect 
drug debts. 
 The next day, Solomon confirmed in a text message to 
Joseph that he would buy the Tasers for a total of $1,700; the 
CI paid Solomon in cash a week later.  On September 9, 
2011, Solomon and the CI went to a law enforcement 
equipment store, where Solomon used his official position to 
purchase two Tasers for $1,569.90.  Afterward, Solomon sent 
a text to Joseph, telling him he had the two Tasers. 
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 On September 14, 2011, Solomon spoke to Joseph on 
the phone and agreed to provide protection for a 10-kilogram 
cocaine shipment on September 26 or 27 while wearing his 
police uniform.  Joseph confirmed via text that the transaction 
would occur on the 26th, and Solomon agreed to be there.  On 
the 26th, Solomon gave Joseph the Tasers, and instructions on 
how to use them, in a local commuter parking lot.  Soon after, 
Joseph and a fellow undercover agent engaged in another fake 
drug deal, while Solomon looked on from his police car.  
Joseph then gave Solomon $5,000 for protecting that 
transaction, as well as $300 as a tip for acquiring the Tasers.  
In total, Solomon was paid $8,800 in connection with the 
drug transactions and Tasers. 
 On October 26, 2011, Solomon was indicted on three 
counts of extortion under color of official right, in violation of 
the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. On January 4, 2013, he 
entered an open plea of guilty. 
B 
 The United States Probation Office prepared a 
Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), calculating 
Solomon’s Sentencing Guidelines range under § 2C1.1, 
which applies to extortion under color of official right. After 
deducting three levels for acceptance of responsibility, 
Solomon’s offense level was 19. He had no prior criminal 
history, so his initial Guidelines range was 30 to 37 months’ 
imprisonment. Critical to this case and unfortunately for 
Solomon, § 2C1.1 includes a cross-reference, § 2C1.1(c)(1), 
which states:  
 If the offense was committed for the purpose of 
facilitating the commission of another criminal 
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offense, apply the offense guideline applicable 
to a conspiracy to commit that other offense, if 
the resulting offense level is greater than that 
determined above.  
Because Solomon believed he was providing protection for 
two cocaine deals and obtained restricted Tasers with the 
understanding they would be used to collect drug debts, the 
Probation Office determined that Solomon had accepted the 
payments “for the purpose of facilitating” cocaine trafficking.  
 Pursuant to the cross-reference, the Probation Office 
calculated Solomon’s offense level under the Guideline for 
conspiracy to commit cocaine trafficking, § 2D1.1, to 
determine whether it was greater than Solomon’s offense 
level under the Guideline applicable to his Hobbs Act crime. 
Because of the large quantity of (fake) cocaine involved (at 
least 5 kilograms but less than 15 kilograms), the base offense 
level was 32, plus a 2-level enhancement for possession of a 
dangerous weapon on account of the guns Solomon had with 
him while he was in his police car “protecting” the drug 
transaction. After applying a 3-level reduction for acceptance 
of responsibility, Solomon’s offense level under the drug 
trafficking Guideline was 31, resulting in a range of 108 to 
135 months, far higher than under the Hobbs Act.  
Solomon argued that the cross-reference should not 
apply because he did not commit and could not have 
committed “another criminal offense,” because everyone else 
involved in the reverse sting that ensnared him was working 
for the government. The District Court disagreed.  
 After the issuance of the original PSR, the Government 
also asked the District Court to apply an additional 2-level 
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enhancement for abuse of a position of trust pursuant to § 
3B1.3, which would further increase Solomon’s Guidelines 
range to 135 to 168 months. Solomon objected on the ground 
that Application Note 6 of § 2C1.1—the section under which 
Solomon’s sentence originated—expressly prohibits the 
application of the abuse of a position of trust enhancement. 
The Government countered that Application Note 6 did not 
apply because Solomon was being sentenced under § 2D1.1 
(drug trafficking), not under § 2C1.1 (Hobbs Act). The 
District Court agreed with the Government and sentenced 
Solomon to 135 months, the bottom of his final Guidelines 
range. This timely appeal followed.  
II1 
 On appeal, Solomon challenges the District Court’s 
application of both the cocaine trafficking Guideline under 
the § 2C1.1(c)(1) cross-reference and the abuse of trust 
enhancement under § 3B1.3. We exercise plenary review over 
a district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. 
United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en 
banc).  
A 
 Solomon first claims that the District Court erred by 
sentencing him under the cocaine trafficking Guideline 
pursuant to the § 2C1.1(c)(1) cross-reference because he 
“could not be properly charged with or convicted of ‘another 
criminal offense.’” Solomon Br. 14. Specifically, he contends 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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that he “could not properly be charged with intent to 
distribute or distribution of a controlled substance, because 
that offense requires that the defendant distribute actual drugs 
or possess with the intent to distribute actual drugs.” Id. The 
drug deals in Solomon’s case were staged by the 
Government, using fake drugs. Solomon also claims the 
cross-reference should not apply because he could not 
properly be charged with a drug distribution conspiracy since 
“all of the other participants in the purported conspiracy were 
government agents.” Id. Thus, he argues, there was no “other 
offense” and no conspiracy.   
 Solomon’s arguments on this issue fail because they 
run contrary to the clear language of the Guidelines. He 
pleaded guilty to three counts of extortion under color of 
official right, a crime covered by Part C of the Guidelines 
(“Offenses Involving Public Officials and Violations of 
Federal Election Campaign Laws”). The applicable Guideline 
sets a base offense level of 14 for any defendant who was a 
public official, § 2C1.1(a), and also increases the offense 
level if certain characteristics are present, such as more than 
one bribe or extortion. § 2C1.1(b). It then lists the cross-
reference at issue in this appeal, which reads: 
 If the offense was committed for the purpose of 
facilitating the commission of another criminal 
offense, apply the offense guideline applicable 
to a conspiracy to commit that other offense, if 
the resulting offense level is greater than that 
determined above.  
§ 2C1.1(c)(1) (emphasis added). According to Application 
Note 5, “resulting offense level” means “the final offense 
level (i.e., the offense level determined by taking into account 
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both the Chapter Two offense level and any applicable 
adjustments from Chapter Three, Parts A-D.)” The 
Background Commentary to § 2C1.1(c)(1) adds: “For 
example, if a bribe was given to a law enforcement officer to 
allow the smuggling of a quantity of cocaine, the guideline 
for conspiracy to import cocaine would be applied if it 
resulted in a greater offense level.” 
 The Guidelines thus plainly do not require that the 
defendant could have been charged with “another criminal 
offense”—only that the purpose of the bribe or extortion was 
to facilitate the commission of another crime. This critical 
distinction refutes Solomon’s argument. The Government 
does not contend, nor do the Guidelines require, that Solomon 
actually facilitated another criminal offense. Rather, he 
pleaded guilty to receiving illegal payments and taking 
actions that he thought were furthering cocaine trafficking. 
This doubly corrupt purpose—as opposed to, for instance, a 
public official accepting payments in exchange for taking an 
otherwise legal action—explains why the Guidelines provide 
for increased punishment of defendants covered by the cross-
reference.  
 The few appellate courts that have considered the 
applicability of the cross-reference have reached the same 
conclusion we reach today. In United States v. Ruiz, the Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the cross-reference 
applied to a Border Patrol agent who accepted payments for 
protecting a cocaine deal that turned out to be a sting 
operation. 621 F.3d 390, 392–93 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
Like Solomon, Ruiz challenged the cross-reference by 
arguing that he could not have entered into a conspiracy with 
government agents. Id. at 393–94. The Fifth Circuit 
disagreed, noting that “because Ruiz took bribes to facilitate 
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the smuggling of cocaine, his offense falls squarely under the 
scenario the [Guideline Background] describes.” Id. at 395. 
Ruiz was consistent with previous decisions of panels of the 
Fifth Circuit. See United States v. Williams, 332 F. App’x 
937, 939–40 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The predicate for application of 
§ 2C1.1(c)(1) is not the existence of a conspiracy, but rather 
that the purpose of the offense was to facilitate the 
commission of another criminal offense.”); United States v. 
Carr, 303 F. App’x 166, 169 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he issue of 
whether a conspiracy between Carr and the informant was 
legally impossible does not affect the applicability of the 
cross reference. By its plain language, § 2C1.1(c)(1) requires 
only that the primary offense be committed ‘for the purpose 
of facilitating’ another offense. . . . USSG § 2C1.1(c)(1) does 
not by its language or stated purpose require that the elements 
of conspiracy be established.”). 
 Like the Fifth Circuit, a panel of the Fourth Circuit 
reached much the same conclusion, writing that “[a] 
defendant may be sentenced under § 2C1.1(c)’s cross-
reference provision for a fictitious crime created via a sting 
operation,” including based on the fictitious amount of 
“drugs” involved. United States v. Brannen, 145 F.3d 1326 
(table), 1998 WL 230823, at *2 (4th Cir. May 11, 1998); cf. 
United States v. Shenberg, 89 F.3d 1461, 1474–75 (11th Cir. 
1996) (affirming sentence under cross-reference when 
defendant provided information under belief that it would 
result in murder).  
 Solomon makes a policy argument that sentencing him 
as a cocaine trafficker thwarts the Guidelines’ intent to 
balance a defendant’s actual conduct with his charged 
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conduct. U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, Policy Statement 4(a).
2
 
According to Solomon, applying the cross-reference causes 
him to be sentenced for neither his real offense nor his 
charged offense. Rather, he was sentenced as if he committed 
conspiracy to commit cocaine trafficking, an offense he could 
not have committed on these facts despite being charged with 
violating the Hobbs Act. This did not stop the Fifth Circuit 
from applying the cross-reference in Ruiz, or its panels from 
doing so in Williams and Carr, but Solomon attempts to 
distinguish his case by arguing that the Fifth Circuit did not 
consider his policy argument. He additionally notes that 
Shenberg, Brannen, and United States v. Burke, 431 F.3d 883 
(5th Cir. 2005), involved actual conspiracies. Even conceding 
that Solomon’s case is different, however, his argument runs 
headlong into the text of the cross-reference, which says 
nothing about whether other conduct could have been charged 
and certainly does not require it. Moreover, the cross-
reference is part of the Hobbs Act sentencing Guideline. 
                                                 
2
 See also United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 869 
(3d Cir. 1997): 
 
The Guidelines are, at bottom, a 
modified real offense system . . . . More 
specifically, they are a mix of a charge offense 
system and a pure real offense system in that it 
bases a sentence on both the formal offense of 
conviction and on the actual conduct of the 
defendant. . . . Therefore, it is clear that the 
Guidelines envisioned that sentencing courts 
would consider at least some conduct for which 
a defendant was not actually charged. 
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 We recognize Solomon’s understandable frustration 
with receiving a significantly higher sentence based on a 
quantity of fake drugs determined at the discretion of the 
Government. Had “Joseph” asked Solomon to “provide 
protection” for a shipment involving only 1 kilogram of 
cocaine, for instance, Solomon’s offense level would have 
been 27 and his Guidelines range 70 to 87 months, a little 
more than half his actual Guidelines range. Then-Chief Judge 
Edith Jones addressed this concern in Williams, which was 
factually similar to Solomon’s case. There, Williams twice 
agreed to “escort a shipment of cocaine as it passed through 
the county in exchange for cash payments from an undercover 
agent.” 332 F. App’x at 938. He believed the first shipment 
contained 5 kilograms and the second 10 kilograms. Id. Like 
Solomon, Williams had no previous criminal record. Id. A 
panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the application of the 
cross-reference in a per curiam opinion. Id. In a footnote, 
Judge Jones agreed that the sentence “must be affirmed under 
applicable law,” but also opined that she “strongly believe[d] 
that the government miscarried justice by insisting” that 
Williams “be sentenced . . . on the basis of contrived amounts 
of non-existent cocaine.” Id. at 937 n.1.  
 Although we have not spoken to the issue, other courts 
have raised similar concerns about the potential for 
government manipulation of the Guidelines range in reverse 
sting operations. See United States v. Sed, 601 F.3d 224, 229–
30 (3d Cir. 2010). However, for purposes of Solomon’s 
appeal, we note that the Guidelines address the reverse-sting 
context by focusing on the agreed-upon amount of the 
controlled substance to determine the quantity of drugs 
involved for sentencing purposes. § 2D1.1 cmt. 5. While it is 
true that the Government suggested specific quantities of 
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cocaine, it is also true that Solomon willingly acceded to the 
plan at a time when he still believed real drugs were involved. 
See Brannen, 1998 WL 230823 at *1 (“Although [the 
quantity of drugs] was suggested by the informant, Brannen 
never objected or requested that the informant reduce the 
quantity.”).  
 Solomon next contends that even if he did commit 
extortion for the purpose of committing another criminal 
offense, that offense would be conspiracy with intent to 
distribute a controlled substance, meaning that under the 
cross-reference the District Court would sentence him for 
conspiracy to commit conspiracy to distribute drugs—a 
nonexistent “double inchoate crime.” Solomon Br. 16. We are 
unpersuaded. The facts make clear that Solomon accepted 
payments with the intent to facilitate cocaine trafficking. 
Therefore, we “apply the offense guideline applicable to a 
conspiracy to commit [cocaine trafficking].” § 2C1.1(c)(1). 
This is so because agreeing to accept an illegal payment to 
facilitate another crime is akin to joining a conspiracy to 
commit that crime and can be punished accordingly. The 
example provided in the Guidelines Background—“if a bribe 
was given to a law enforcement officer to allow the 
smuggling of a quantity of cocaine, the guideline for 
conspiracy to import cocaine would be applied”3—only 
reinforces our interpretation.  
 Nor is Solomon correct that if any cross-reference 
encompassed his conduct, it was § 2C1.1(c)(2), which applies 
“[i]f the offense was committed for the purpose of 
concealing, or obstructing justice with respect to, another 
criminal offense.” Although Solomon asked the CI for 
                                                 
3
 § 2C1.1 Commentary, Background.  
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advance notice of the transaction so he could assign other 
officers away from the meeting place, his conduct was more 
akin to “facilitation” than “concealment” or “obstruction.” 
Facilitation is prospective; the defendant accepts payments to 
further the commission of a crime, which is what happened 
here. By contrast, concealment and obstruction are 
retrospective, and apply after a crime has already occurred 
and the defendant accepts payments to cover it up or to 
impede an ongoing investigation. See, e.g., United States v. 
Pompey, 17 F.3d 351, 352–53 (11th Cir. 1994) (bribe paid to 
law enforcement officials to drop cocaine charges “was for 
the purpose of obstructing justice in another criminal offense” 
such that Guidelines cross-reference could apply). 
  Finally, we decline Solomon’s request to apply the rule 
of lenity, because the language of § 2C1.1(c)(1) is not 
ambiguous. Solomon argues that the Guidelines do not define 
“another criminal offense,” leaving it unclear “whether [it] 
means an actual offense for which a defendant could have 
been properly charged or convicted, or something else.” 
Solomon Br. 20. Again, the Guidelines state that for the 
cross-reference to apply, the defendant must accept payments 
“for the purpose of facilitating the commission of another 
criminal offense.” § 2C1.1(c)(1). The key word is 
“purpose”—i.e., the reason the defendant accepted the 
payments. Regardless of whether Solomon could be charged 
with conspiracy to traffic cocaine, he knew he was accepting 
money to further what he believed to be a drug transaction—
“another criminal offense” above and beyond Hobbs Act 
extortion. This is not ambiguous; it is easily distinguishable 
from conduct that would not qualify, such as if Solomon had 
accepted a payment to write a parking ticket that he could 
have written legally. Accordingly, the cross-reference applies 
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to Solomon’s conduct and the fact that the Guideline is 
susceptible to criticism on policy grounds does not render it 
ambiguous. The District Court did not err in this regard.  
B 
 Solomon also challenges the District Court’s 
application of the 2-level enhancement for abuse of a position 
of trust, § 3B1.3,
4
 which increased his Guidelines range from 
108–135 months to 135–168 months. He argues that the 
enhancement cannot apply to sentences originating under § 
2C1.1—even those, like his, with a Guidelines range 
ultimately determined pursuant to a cross-reference. The 
Government disagrees, contending that the enhancement 
applies because once the cross-reference was triggered, 
Solomon was actually sentenced under § 2D1.1. In light of 
the language, context, and history of the Guidelines at issue, 
we believe Solomon has the better of the argument.  
Although our consideration of this issue requires 
careful analysis of several relevant Guidelines, the parties’ 
dispute essentially boils down to one question: was Solomon 
sentenced exclusively under § 2D1.1? If so, then there is no 
impediment to the application of the abuse of trust 
enhancement against him. Viewed in a vacuum, § 3B1.3 
would apply to Solomon because it is not “included in the 
                                                 
4
 “If the defendant abused a position of public or 
private trust . . . in a manner that significantly facilitated the 
commission or concealment of the offense, increase by 2 
levels. This adjustment may not be employed if an abuse of 
trust or skill is included in the base offense level or specific 
offense characteristic.” 
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base offense level or specific offense characteristic” of the 
cross-reference (§ 2D1.1) that applies to him. But Application 
Note 6 to § 2C1.1, the Guideline governing Solomon’s 
convictions, states: “Do not apply § 3B1.3 (Abuse of Position 
of Trust or Use of Special Skill).” This prohibition apparently 
accounts for the fact that § 2C1.1 already provides a 2-level 
increase if the defendant was a public official and allows the 
court to apply an even higher offense level—through the § 
2C1.1(c)(1) cross-reference—if that official solicited or 
received payments “for the purpose of facilitating the 
commission of another offense.”  
To understand how these two provisions interact in 
this case, we must carefully look to Guidelines language 
governing cross-references. As noted previously, 
§ 2C1.1(c)(1) directs a court to “apply the offense guideline 
applicable to conspiracy to commit [another] offense . . . if 
the resulting offense level is greater than that determined 
[under the ordinary Hobbs Act guidelines].” However, a court 
cannot make that comparison without ascertaining the other 
offense level and determining how it should be calculated. 
Here, “the ‘resulting offense level’ means the final offense 
level (i.e., the offense level determined by taking into account 
both the Chapter Two offense level and any applicable 
adjustments from Chapter Three, Parts A-D).” § 2C1.1, 
Application Note 5 (emphasis added). How does the 
sentencing judge determine which Chapter Three adjustments 
are applicable? According to Guidelines General Application 
Principle § 1B1.5(c),
5
 they are “determined in respect to the 
                                                 
5
 Part of Guidelines section § 1B1.5, “Interpretation of 
References to Other Offense Guidelines.” 
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referenced offense guideline, except as otherwise expressly 
provided.” (emphasis added).  
The parties here diverge over the meaning of “except 
as otherwise expressly provided.” In Solomon’s view, 
Application Note 6 of § 2C1.1 is exactly the kind of express 
prohibition the Guidelines contemplate. It plainly and without 
exception forbids application of the abuse of trust 
enhancement. To the Government, however, “except as 
otherwise expressly provided” actually means “except as 
otherwise expressly provided in the cross-referenced 
Guideline.” Under this reading, § 2C1.1’s prohibition is 
irrelevant to the calculation of Solomon’s offense level under 
the cocaine trafficking Guideline, because that occurs under 
§ 2D1.1, which does not forbid a court from applying the 
abuse of trust enhancement.  
 The parties’ disagreement requires us to determine 
whether § 2C1.1’s express prohibition on applying the abuse 
of trust enhancement extends to offense levels calculated 
under the cross-reference, which necessarily implicates other 
Guidelines. For several reasons, we conclude that it does.  
 First, this result makes sense under an order-of-
operations approach. To determine whether the Hobbs Act 
offense level is higher or lower than that “applicable to 
conspiracy to commit [the other] offense,” the sentencing 
judge must calculate the offense level under the cross-
referenced Guideline and then compare it to the ordinary 
Hobbs Act offense level, relying on the language of the § 
2C1.1(c)(1) cross-reference. In doing so, the court cannot 
apply an offense level stemming from another Guideline 
without referring back to the language of § 2C1.1, the 
Guideline under which the sentence originates, including 
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Application Note 6. In addition, by the time the court makes 
the comparison, it will have already calculated both possible 
outcomes, so no further enhancements can apply.  
 Stated another way, Application Note 6’s prohibition 
of the abuse of trust enhancement is effective because the 
sentencing court never abandons § 2C1.1. There is a 
difference between determining an offense level by reference 
to another Guideline and transferring out of one’s original 
Guideline altogether. Even if a defendant ultimately receives 
an increased offense level under the cross-reference, as 
Solomon did, he is still sentenced under § 2C1.1—the 
Guideline governing his offense of conviction—even though 
his offense level is undoubtedly driven by § 2D1.1, courtesy 
of the cross-reference.  
 The plain language of the Guidelines also supports 
Solomon’s argument. Section 1B1.5(c) states that in cross-
reference cases, Chapter Three adjustments “are determined 
in respect to the referenced offense guideline, except as 
otherwise expressly provided.” Here, § 2C1.1 contains an 
express provision, Application Note 6, stating that a specific 
Chapter Three adjustment (the abuse of trust enhancement) 
does not apply. We cannot ignore this, particularly because 
the Government does not point to other Guidelines language 
that supports an alternative interpretation or indicates that a 
sentencing court abandons § 2C1.1 when applying the cross-
reference. Instead, the Government simply urges us to limit 
the reach of “except as otherwise expressly provided” and 
read Application Note 6 as applying only to offense levels 
calculated under § 2C1.1, not those that use the cross-
reference. We are more persuaded by Solomon’s view 
because Application Note 6 simply states: “Do not apply 
§ 3B1.3 (Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill).” 
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It does not allow for any exceptions. Therefore, we believe it 
encompasses sentences that rely on the cross-reference to 
determine the offense level.  
 The history of § 2C1.1 also bolsters our conclusion, 
because before November 2004 the relevant application note 
did contain an exception for cases in which the offense level 
was determined under a cross-reference. It stated: 
 Do not apply § 3B1.1 (Abuse of Position of 
Trust or Use of Special Skill), except where the 
offense level is determined under § 2C1.1(c)(1), 
(2), or (3). In such cases, an adjustment from § 
3B1.1 (Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of 
Special Skill) may apply. 
§ 2C1.1, Application Note 3 (2003) (emphasis added). 
Amendment 666, a November 2004 revision of the public 
corruption Guidelines, changed the language to its current 
form: “Do not apply § 3B1.3 (Abuse of Position of Trust or 
Use of Special Skill).” Although the “Reason for 
Amendment” section of Amendment 666 does not explain 
why the language was changed, it would be improper for us 
to give no effect to the Sentencing Commission’s amendment. 
See, e.g., Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 72 (3d Cir. 2000) (“In 
interpreting [an] alteration in [statutory] language, we must 
presume, as always, that th[e] amendment was intended to 
have ‘real and substantial effect.’” (quoting Stone v. I.N.S., 
514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995))). Under the Government’s reading, 
Solomon would lose under both the prior and current 
versions, even though the Guideline once provided for 
application of the enhancement in cross-reference cases and 
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no longer does. We cannot accept the Government’s tacit 
insistence that the amendment does no work.
6
 
                                                 
6
 Contrary to the dissent’s contention, our 
interpretation of the revised cross-reference comports with 
Amendment 666’s stated purpose of “increas[ing] punishment 
for bribery, gratuity, and ‘honest services’ cases” and 
accounts for a defendant’s status as a public official. This is 
so because the cross-reference applies only if the offense 
level under the cross-referenced Guideline is higher than the 
§ 2C1.1 offense level, which already takes public official 
status into account. Prior to Amendment 666, § 2C1.1 set the 
base offense level at 10 for all defendants. Amendment 666 
increased the base offense level to 14 for public officials, 
compared to 12 for all other defendants. Thus, the revised 
Guideline already includes a two-level increase for public 
officials. This helps explain why the abuse of trust 
enhancement no longer applies when the cross-reference is 
used—it is incorporated into the base offense level instead.  
Similarly, it is incorrect to state, as the dissent does, 
that absent the abuse of trust enhancement, “the offense level 
[under the cross-reference] would be the same as if a member 
of the general public had committed this cross-referenced 
crime.” This elides the distinction between a sentence under 
the § 2C1.1 cross-reference and a sentence directly under 
§ 2D1.1. Had Solomon been convicted of cocaine trafficking, 
his offense level would have been determined directly under § 
2D1.1, and he would have been eligible for the abuse of trust 
enhancement. But he was convicted of violating the Hobbs 
Act. Consequently, his sentence should not be compared to 
one imposed upon a defendant who actually committed a 
drug offense.  
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 The Government correctly notes that the amended 
language did not stop a panel of the Fifth Circuit from 
concluding that the enhancement could still apply in cross-
reference cases. See United States v. Carr, 303 F. App’x 166 
(5th Cir. 2008). Indeed, the District Court also looked to 
Carr, which appears to be the only case to take up this issue 
based on the current Guidelines language, in applying the 
enhancement to Solomon’s sentence. In Carr, the panel 
acknowledged the changed language of the § 2C1.1 
application note, but declared conclusorily that it “does not 
warrant a different result” than that reached in cases under the 
previous language. Id. at 170. Although the panel noted § 
1B1.5(c)’s “except as otherwise expressly provided” language 
on applying Chapter Three adjustments, it did not analyze it 
or otherwise proceed as if it might apply. Instead, it merely 
stated that the application notes to § 2C1.1 do not apply “once 
the offense level is determined pursuant to the cross-
referenced guideline.” Id. at 171. 
 For the reasons noted already, we are convinced that 
Carr got the timing wrong. A court can apply the cross-
reference—and thus, rely on a different Guidelines range to 
sentence a defendant—only after calculating the offense level 
under both § 2C1.1 and the cross-referenced Guideline (here, 
§ 2D1.1), including “any applicable enhancements” (§ 2C1.1, 
Application Note 5) and determining which is higher. Here, 
the District Court calculated the final offense level under § 
2C1.1 and concluded it was 19. It then stated that “the 
guideline computations related to . . . drug distribution[] 
produces the higher overall offense level” and that 
“[a]ccordingly, the guideline computations will be calculated 
under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.” A3. In this case, that would be true 
regardless of when any applicable enhancements were 
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applied, but the Guidelines nonetheless direct the court to 
calculate the sentence under the cross-referenced Guideline, 
including enhancements, before determining whether to use 
the offense level under § 2C1.1 or the cross-reference. These 
calculations and analyses all take place pursuant to § 2C1.1, 
which prohibits the application of the abuse of trust 
enhancement. Arguing that Solomon was “not sentenced 
under [§ 2C1.1] because of the application of the cross 
reference,” as the Government does, is thus not entirely 
accurate. Solomon’s final Guidelines range was determined 
by the higher offense level of § 2D1.1, but he was sentenced 
pursuant to § 2C1.1, the Guideline applicable to his crime of 
conviction.  
 We thus conclude that Application Note 6’s express 
prohibition on the abuse of trust enhancement applies to any 
sentence originating under § 2C1.1, even those that ultimately 
apply the offense level for another Guideline pursuant to the 
cross-reference. Because we conclude the District Court erred 
in applying the abuse of trust enhancement, we must remand 
for resentencing, as on this record we “cannot presume [the 
District Court] would have imposed the same sentence, given 
the opportunity to consider the correctly calculated 
Guideline.” United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 217 (3d 
Cir. 2008). Of course, we leave to the District Court’s 
discretion the determination of an appropriate sentence in 
light of the corrected Guidelines range of 108 to 135 months.  
*  *  * 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s application of the cross-reference but reverse its 
application of the abuse of trust enhancement. We therefore 
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vacate Solomon’s sentence and remand for resentencing in 
accordance with this opinion. 
United States v. Solomon 
 
No. 13-3108 
_________________________________________________             
                                                                                                                                           
        
ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:  
 Although I agree with the majority that the District 
Court properly applied the cross reference in § 2C1.1(c)(1), I 
do not believe that the application notes in § 2C1.1 precluded 
the District Court from applying an adjustment for breach of 
trust pursuant to § 3B1.3.  Rather, I would hold that sentences 
calculated pursuant to a cross reference are not limited by the 
restrictions on adjustments applicable to the original 
Guideline, unless the Guidelines expressly make those 
restrictions applicable when using a cross reference.
1
  I 
therefore respectfully dissent.  
 
 Solomon was eligible to receive a § 3B1.3 adjustment 
for abuse of trust because his sentence was calculated 
pursuant to § 2D1.1, not § 2C1.1.  The Guidelines instruct 
that “[i]f the offense level is determined by a reference to 
another guideline . . . the adjustments in Chapter Three 
(Adjustments) also are determined in respect to the referenced 
                                              
1
 As the majority notes, a panel of the Fifth Circuit, in a non-
precedential opinion, has reached the same conclusion.  
United States v. Carr, 303 F. App’x 166 (5th Cir. 2008).  In a 
later precedential opinion, the Fifth Circuit has also affirmed 
application of an abuse-of-trust increase when applying the 
cross reference in § 2C1.1(c)(1).  See United States v. Ruiz, 
621 F.3d 390 (5th Cir. 2010). 
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offense guideline, except as otherwise expressly provided.”  
Id. § 1B1.5(c).  Section 2C1.1 does not “expressly provide[]” 
that the sentencing court must not apply an adjustment for 
abuse of trust pursuant to § 3B1.3 when imposing a sentence 
through the cross reference in § 2C1.1(c)(1).  Id.  Rather it 
states, in full, “Inapplicability of §3B1.3.—Do not apply § 
3B1.3 (Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill).”  
Id. § 2C1.1, cmt. n.6.  Although this language plainly bars 
application of § 3B1.3 when the sentence is calculated 
pursuant to § 2C1.1, it is silent as to whether the ban on an 
abuse-of-trust adjustment applies when a cross reference is 
used.  As such, it does not “expressly provide[]” that Chapter 
Three adjustments are not to be determined in respect to the 
referenced offense guideline.  Id. § 1B1.5(c); see Elliott v. 
Archdiocese of N.Y., 682 F.3d 213, 225–26 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(defining “express” as “directly and distinctly stated or 
expressed rather than implied or left to reference” (quoting 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 803 
(Merriam–Webster 1986)). 
 
 When compared to other Guidelines, it becomes even 
more evident that § 2C1.1 does not expressly limit sentencing 
courts from applying an abuse-of-trust adjustment when the 
cross reference applies.  Section 2K1.4(c), to take one 
example, directs courts sentencing a defendant who is 
determined to be a career offender on certain firearms charges 
to determine the guideline sentence by reference to § 4B1.1.  
In addition, § 2K2.4(c) expressly provides that, with certain 
exceptions, “Chapters Three and Four shall not apply to that 
count of conviction.”  U.S.S.G. § 2K1.4(c).  Unlike § 
2K1.4(c), neither § 2C1.1(c) nor its application notes contain 
such express language precluding application of an abuse-of-
trust adjustment when a cross reference is applied.   
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 Simple logic also compels this result.  Section 2C1.1 is 
unusual in that it directs the sentencing court to consider both 
the Chapter Two offense level and any applicable 
adjustments from Chapter Three when calculating the 
“greater offense level” for purposes of determining whether 
to apply a cross reference.  See id. § 1B1.5(d).  If the 
limitations on Chapter Three adjustments applied equally to 
sentences calculated under § 2C1.1 directly and those under 
the cross reference, there would be no reason to consider 
Chapter Three adjustments at this stage.  The Chapter Three 
adjustments would always be the same for both calculations 
and consideration of those adjustments would not add 
anything to the base offense level as determined by Chapter 
Two.    
 
 The fact that the relevant application note previously 
expressly indicated that an abuse-of-trust adjustment might 
apply when a sentence is calculated by cross reference should 
not change this result.  As an initial matter, we should not 
consider the application note’s history because the plain 
meaning of the relevant Guidelines is conclusive.  See In re 
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 
2005) (“If the meaning is plain, we will make no further 
inquiry unless the literal application of the statute will end in 
a result that conflicts with Congress’s intentions.”).   
 
 Even considering the fact that the Guideline was 
amended, however, Amendment 666 does not support 
Solomon’s argument.  The “Reason for Amendment” 
indicates that it was adopted to “increase[] punishment for 
bribery, gratuity, and ‘honest services’ cases while providing 
additional enhancements to address previously unrecognized 
aggravating factors inherent in some of these offenses.”  
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U.S.S.G. app. C amend. 666 (Supp. 2004).  To accomplish 
this end, the Sentencing Commission streamlined several 
previously dispersed Guidelines and provided higher 
alternative base offenses levels for public officials who abuse 
positions of public trust.  Id.  It would be odd in the extreme 
for the Sentencing Commission to have sought to increase the 
sentences of corrupt public officers by eliminating the use of 
a sentencing increase for abuse of trust when a cross 
reference applies.  The cross-referenced Guideline would not 
account for the defendant’s status as a public official, and the 
offense level would be the same as if a member of the general 
public had committed this cross-referenced crime.
2
  A 
sentencing court’s failure to apply § 3B1.3 would essentially 
ignore the defendant’s abuse of a position of trust despite the 
Sentencing Commission’s stated view that “offenders who 
abuse their position of public trust are inherently more 
culpable than” other offenders.  Id.  In contrast to this 
language, there is no indication in the Sentencing 
Commission’s “Reason for Amendment” that supports the 
majority’s view.  It is far more reasonable to conclude that the 
                                              
2
 The majority asserts that the cross-reference accounts for a 
defendant’s public official status because § 2C1.1 now sets 
the base offense level two levels higher for public officials as 
compared to other defendants.  That increase, however, does 
not apply to drug crimes sentenced pursuant to § 2D1.1 or 
any other offense guideline that would be cross referenced.  
Because the original and cross-referenced guidelines are 
calculated separately and then compared to determine which 
produces the higher resulting offense level, under the 
majority’s view the defendant’s public official status would 
not be accounted for at any point in calculating the result of 
applying a cross reference. 
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Sentencing Commission merely deleted language it thought 
was superfluous from the relevant application note. 
 
 Because I believe the District Court committed no 
error in applying a sentencing adjustment for abuse of a 
position of trust pursuant to § 3B1.5, I respectfully dissent. 
